By Dr. Peter C. Lugten
Moralists, in order to have anything worthwhile to say, must first understand the nature of good and evil, and whether the individual is able to make a choice between them.
The term “Good” can be defined as “that which accords with the prevalent system of morality”, or, from a utilitarian perspective, “that which makes everybody happy”. That there is a gap between these two definitions was made clear by the world leader of one prevalent system of morality, Pope John Paul II, in his address to the Catholic World Youth Festival in Toronto on July 25, 2002. (1). He warned his audience to be careful of the snares of worldly pleasures in their pursuit of happiness, which could only be found in God. Exploring the “happiness” gap between the two definitions will be like using the philosopher’s toolkit to open a Pandora’s box of contemporary moral controversy. The term “Evil” can likewise be defined as “that which violates the prevalent system of morality”, or, “that which deliberately causes others to suffer pain, sorrow, inconsolable grief, despair, anger and a sense of outrage”.
The problem of Good and Evil has perplexed theologians for many centuries, and it is both instructive and entertaining to examine their discomfort. It is generally agreed that both Good and Evil exist in primary form, where they stem from natural causes, and in secondary form, where they result from deliberate human action. It is common to ask why a God of infinite Goodness should allow the existence of Evil in either category to plague the Faithful and the Infidel alike on his beloved planet Earth. It runs counter to popular logic that this should be so. A Perfect God would be expected to create a perfect world, so the existence of evil has provided the Church with its most persistent critical tests. The ensuing series of arguments attempt to rationalize evil and also serve as an introduction to the concept of Free Will.
1) Good is necessary for the Greater Glory of God, and Evil is therefore necessary for purposes of comparison. This means that God created Evil for his own self-Glory, which would be a sin.
2) Evil is explained as being similar to the discordant notes in a symphony, which nonetheless contribute to a concordant, harmonious whole. But unlike the discordant notes in a symphony, which have no direct experience of their own discordance, the suffering of human beings is experienced directly by themselves. A benevolent God would not expect us to suffer for an esthetic pleasure that only He could appreciate.
3) Evil results in suffering that reveals humanity’s sin and brokenness, as was argued by Peter Steinfels in his “Beliefs” column in the New York Times(2). Jesus overcomes this suffering and leads to God and redemption. But why should only suffering be redemptive? For instance, excellence, in any field, from morals to athletics, achievements to hand down to the next generation – these things, in a world without suffering, could be equally redemptive.
4) Evil may exist for the sake of Greater Good. The quenching of a thirst (good) cannot be experienced without thirst (evil) in the first place. Because the goodness of quenching thirst is greater than evil of thirst itself, so evil is necessary for greater good. However, a Perfect God would still be expected to distribute the evil and greater good equitably, so that everyone would receive an equal surplus of the greater good.
5) Evil may be necessary for Moral Good. Without the primary evil of tragic natural events there could not be the secondary good, or moral good, of relieving distress in others. A world without secondary, or moral good, would not be the greatest of possible worlds. The creation of primary evil to promote moral goodness is an example by God of tertiary goodness, similar to that exercised by parents in the punishment of the children they love. Indeed, many believe that primary evil is sent down on a community to punish general licentiousness. But a perfect God could not punish the innocent as well as the guilty. This would be an act of extraordinary evil (the execution of innocent people), and stupidity (too few people would believe it to be a warning for it to make any difference to the amount of wickedness in the world, and even fewer would alter their ways in response). An intelligent god, or a loving god, or any qualified dog trainer knows that to change behavior, you use rewards, not threats and punishment. Even if, as a result of Divine violence, a few wicked souls repented and were saved, a perfect God would not have to take so much life to save the souls of so few. Likewise, even if a widespread Righteous outrage then led to closing of all fleshpots, a natural calamity is a very high price to pay, just for a perfect God to cleanse a town of its vice. If a mere mortal were to label Americans as being sinful “unbelievers” deserving of death, and then wreak havoc and destruction on American cities, we would not hesitate to denounce that person as an evil-doer. A god who acted the same way must be just as evil, and not morally fit to be worshiped. Even if that God created us. A father does not have the right to abuse and terrorize his children. I don’t think there is anyone who would agree that the outpouring of moral goodness that follows a natural disaster is able to begin to compensate for the enormous suffering of its victims.
In addition, God also chose to introduce moral evil, which is what happens when people inflict suffering on one another. No matter what kind of a moral Good this might generate in reaction, it is indisputable that moral evil causes the innocent to suffer. The suffering induced by moral evil is qualitatively different from that induced by natural evil. If bodily injury occurs during an accident, one can put the blame on bad luck and get on with recovery. But if it occurs as an act of intimidation against the exposure of corruption, or schoolyard bullying, or acts of terrorism, then the mental anguish can be worse than the pain. One can accept misfortune but it is much harder to accept injustice. The creation of secondary, or moral evil, is an example by God of the tertiary promotion of evil by the punishment of the morally good. It has been argued that if God could stop every act of moral evil, then people would cease acting on their own to try to fight evil, not the result that God would want. But the fight against moral evil need not seem so futile, and anyway, there would still be primary evil to help each other overcome. Whatever God’s intention, the result in practice is a world dominated by the tertiary evil of injustice. Therefore, this is not the best of all possible worlds. This is not the world we would expect a Perfect God to create.
Those that argue that Evil in the world may be compatible with the design of a Benevolent God must accept that God deserves no free pass on the question of whether He is Good or Evil. Indeed, they should be able to explain how they can distinguish Benevolence from Malevolence in the behavior of their Divinity. Either there is no God, or there is an impotent God, or there is an all-knowing, powerful God. Theologians claim that we are spiritual beings that will exist for Eternity, and, of course, only a powerful God could grant eternal life. Naturally, believers wish for there to be a powerful God. But consider this: Imagine a madman at the controls of an airplane with a bomb aboard, headed to destroy a large assembly of very good people. Imagine, furthermore, that somehow I am aware of his plan and could detonate his bomb safely over the ocean by pushing a button. Most ethicists would agree that my failure to press the button would constitute a morally wrong choice. I could escape a little blame by saying “It was none of my business”, but not much. Now imagine that I also knew that the madman was on his mission solely for the reason that he thought it was what I wanted him to do. In this case, my failure to stop him makes me a full co-conspirator in the evil act. A powerful God that would allow planes to hit the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, knowing full well that the hi-jackers would shout “Allah u Akbar” as they plowed through the glass, cannot escape blame by saying “I gave man Free Will, and I cannot take it away”. Men imbued with the belief that they have been commanded directly by God have a compromised Free Will. They will not choose to disobey. Therefore, the all powerful shared God of Abraham cannot escape the verdict: guilty of moral evil, of “evil-doing”.
It has also been argued that, instead of seeking to investigate the presence of evil, philosophy should explore God’s (presumptive) response to evil. God might balance a person’s misfortune with some greater good such as Heavenly reward or divine relationship that satisfies an aesthetic that is outside the limits of standard discussions of morality. Perhaps God, having organized the start of our existence, then determined that we should possess a completely Free Will. He would then refuse to interfere in any way with what one did on Earth, but would sit on Judgment of people afterwards. How would He judge the acts of violence that were carried out in His name? How would He judge people who stunt, cripple and permanently impair the intellectual and moral capacity of children by forcing them to believe in the literal veracity of the Koran, the Rig-veda or the Bible? Perhaps, on that Day of Judgement, we should turn the tables; we should be the judge ourselves. There is room to argue that the God of the Old Testament acted like a little portion of evil was driving His behavior. Perhaps this might explain certain far from family-friendly sayings of Jesus that were recorded by Matthew(Chapter 10, between verses 20-38). Given this potential for uncertainty, the prudent and only honorable course is to withhold judgment. An appropriate human response to the “God’s response to evil” argument would be not to accept God, rather than to take the chance that one might be enjoining oneself into the service of a powerful but potentially evil deity. Are our souls so “precious” that we must seek entrance into Heaven at any cost? For what does it profit a person to gain the after-world if it costs his or her soul?
Another religious tradition, that of the classic “Fire and Brimstone” preacher, places God beyond good and evil, giving us the concept, well supported by quotations from the Scriptures, of a Terrible God. The Terrible God demands redefinition of the term “good” to mean that which honors Him, while what is evil becomes all activity not directed at His worship. Suffering in His Name is therefore Good, as is causing others to suffer in His Name. When Evil becomes Good, and Suffering becomes Devotion, then the main casualty is Justice in the world, and a world without Justice is not the best of possible worlds. On the contrary, a Terrible God demands absolute obedience, and will respond to disrespect by inflicting massive destruction on whole communities. Believers in this God, in unguarded moments, will let slip the opinion that God allowed America to be attacked on September 11, 2001: that he deliberately relaxed His “veil of protection” over the country for that occasion. No matter that this implicitly requires God to be Evil. They also believe the Day of Rapture will come soon, when God will lift the Christians up to Heaven, and inflict 7 years of grief and misery, followed by eternal damnation, on everyone left behind. Since this belief requires the destruction of a few billion more or less innocent people, and all the nations in which they live, it is belief in an Evil god. In the 1930’s, a human being came to power and caused 7 years of Tribulation around the world, and the death of millions upon millions of good and innocent people. One could ask whether there is an obvious moral equivalence between the God of “End Times” and the Evil of Adolf Hitler. Because adherents of this belief not only accept the Day of Rapture as inevitable, but also eagerly anticipate its arrival, there is a commitment within that community towards actively helping to cause it as soon as possible. Hence, Evangelical Christians in 2004 voted for George Bush, many claim, in hopes that his mid-East policies would trigger the Apocalypse. Yet since God is not a citizen of the United States, He is an Alien, and since He is powerful, He is thus an Alien Power. For Americans to vote in such a way as to subvert the best interests of their nation to those of an Alien Power, a Power that has threatened to destroy the nation, falls within the definition of High Treason. It is not clear that worshipers of a Terrible God should enjoy any more rights than did communist sympathizers during the 1950’s. As long as they have access to electoral office or appointments to the judicial bench, they can create a self-fulfilling prophecy. We do not need men like James Watt, President Reagan’s first Interior Minister, who in 1981 replied to a House Interior Committee on the question of wilderness areas for future generations: “I do not know how many future generations we can count on before the Lord returns.”(3) We do not need Supreme Court justices like the late Antonin Scalia, who believed that wrongful executions are acceptable because their victims will be compensated by meeting God.(4) We do not need politicians like Senator James Inhofe, who on March 4, 2002, told Congress that the most important reason for supporting Israel was because God said so. Quoting Genesis 13: 14-17, he concluded “That is God talking. This is not a political battle at all. It is a contest over whether or not the Word of God is true.” Nor do we need a leader of the House like Tom DeLay, who in 2002 told the assembled congregation “Ladies and gentlemen, what has been spoken here is the Truth from God!” moments after Pastor John Hagee had declared “The war between America and Iraq is the gateway to the Apocalypse.”(5) We do not need White House operatives like Karl Rove, who secured a second term for President George W. Bush by mobilizing evangelicals, who believed that war in Iraq was a warm-up predicted by the Book of Revelations. (This book says that four angels “which are bound in the great river Euphrates will be released to slay the third part of man.”) Nor did we need a President who, rejecting his father’s advice about invading Iraq, claimed “There is a higher Father I appeal to.”(6), who is quoted as saying (on July 9, 2004): “I trust God speaks through me. Without that, I couldn’t do my job” and who has been described as possessed of a “messianic” sense of mission in taking America to war.
It is an act of moral evil to believe in a terrible God, and an act that will be repaid to devout Christian as it will be repaid to devout Muslim: with betrayal. For instance, Muslims considering an act of martyrdom should familiarize themselves with Christoph Luxenberg’s 2000 work, “Die Syro-aramaische Lesart des Qur’an” (7). By this thesis, some of the words in the Hadiths that describe the reward for martyrdom should be should be considered Syriac, not Arabic, in origin, and the famous “virgins”, of whom 72 are waiting in Heaven, should actually translate into “white raisins” of “crystal clarity”, or, in other words, sultanas, which are associated with wisdom. For those who serve a corrupt version of their religion in the hope of Eternal life, the grapes of their reward may prove very sour, indeed.
The Argument From Free Will
To have true Moral Goodness we must be free to choose moral badness, and it is inevitable that when such a freedom exists, people, as free moral agents, will introduce secondary evil into the world.
While each of arguments (1) to (5) is flawed, the succeeding argument comes to its rescue. Argument 6, however, is the end of the chain. This seemingly sensible argument can be knocked down from three directions simultaneously, indicating that religion cannot account for the existence of evil.
(a) if God were perfect He would create a race of perfect people, whose genuine free choice would, despite its freedom, be, nevertheless, unerringly good. Only in the absence of a Perfect God is it inevitable that personal free choice will admit evil into the world.
(b) God’s purpose in making us free moral agents could only be to test our fitness for Heaven. There would be little joy in Heaven if people on Earth all lived saintly existences on an automatic basis, unable to behave otherwise. Heaven needs people who have been tempted to choose sin, but who, nonetheless, rejected it. However, if God is truly omniscient, then He will know the result of this test from the outset, and all our suffering is redundant. He might as well have created only heaven and hell, and not created Earth with all its suffering at all! The derogation to the individual of genuine Free Will, such that God Himself would be unable to forecast or change the outcome, would be a sacrifice of both Omniscience and Omnipotence. Furthermore, the punishment endured by those of us who fail the test, that of eternal torment, or at a minimum, deprivation of His grace with no hope of forgiveness, requires a sacrifice of His Benevolence. Therefore, the creation of Free Will in Human Beings, necessary for there to be joy in Heaven, requires the destruction of the Perfect God.
(c) It is impossible for God to give us a Free Will for which we are responsible. In the circular disputes between the classical adherents of Free Will versus the Determinists, there was much scope for paradox over the question of whether or not we could control our will if it was predestined or predetermined, or, on the contrary, if it was totally free and indeterminate.
If people have been given by God a Real Choice, there are 2 sequels
1) We are not “predestined”, in the sense of God has fore-ordained all that will come to pass, including our own individual salvation, (or not), because God cannot predict our actions from the outset. People are not “fated” to live a certain life already “written” in God’s fore-knowledge. We write our own future as we go along. St. Augustine of Hippo apparently argued that God’s foreknowledge was not causative, that we cause actions foreseen by Him out of our own free will. But we cannot have free will if our choices are known ahead of time, no matter who chose them.
Theologian Luis de Molina tried to resolve the issue of predestination by ascribing its results to an attribute of God he called “middle knowledge”. He wrote “Middle knowledge is God’s knowledge of all things that would happen in every possible set of circumstances, both things that are determined to occur by those circumstances… Significantly, middle knowledge includes God’s awareness of what every possible individual would freely do in any set of circumstances in which he or she finds himself or herself as well as how utterly random, chance events would turn out in every possible set of circumstances. Armed with this knowledge, God can create a world providentially planned to the last detail where his purposes are achieved through free creaturely decisions and random events” (8) But if God is aware of what every possible individual would freely do, as well as how random events will turn out, such that he can providentially plan to the last detail how to achieve his purposes, then God knows we will definitely act the way he expects us to, and therefore we are predetermined.
2) We are not “predetermined”, in the sense that given the initial conditions of the Universe, it might be possible to predict every single atomic and hence molecular interaction stretching eternally far into the future. Albert Einstein was among the physicists who thought we are determined. Reacting to Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, he exclaimed that God does not play dice! He believed that our uncertainty concerned only our knowledge of the quantum state, which remained deterministic due to “hidden variables”. But in 1964, John Stewart Bell proved that any quantum theory with hidden variables must be nonlocal, i.e., particles can interact instantaneously no matter how far apart they are separated. But nonlocality is a consequence of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty.(9) This brings us back full circle, to God playing dice with Einstein and determinism(10). Dr. Ruth E. Kastner, proponent of the Relativistic Transactional Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, which denies determinism, wrote an article “Why arguments against Free Will based on Physics are hugely overrated”(11). Indeed, as Professor Richard Muller points out in “Now: The Physics of Time”(12) vis a vis Heisenberg’s Uncertainty and the mathematical incompleteness of Kurt Godel, “We can’t predict when an atom will disintegrate, and the Laws of Physics, as they currently exist, say that this failure is fundamental. If we can’t predict such a simple physical phenomenon, then how can we imagine that someday we will be able to show that human behavior is completely deterministic”. The Health Physics Society website entry for “Are Our Bodies Radioactive?”(HPS.org, 2016) points out that the average 70 kg man in the U.S. receives an effective dose of 0.3 mSv per year from radionuclides in his own body, about 10% of that received from background radiation. He has about 5,000 Bq of potassium-40, or 5,000 decays per second, about 10% of which are penetrating gamma rays, as well as beta decays, which deposit their energy in the body. This represents a lot of indeterminism. Professor Paul Davies, in “The Demon in the Machine”(13) says “There is no evidence that the Universe is a closed deterministic system. It could be infinite. And even if it isn’t, it’s an indeterministic quantum system, anyway”. To quote Stephen H. Kellert’s “In the Wake of Chaos: Unpredictable Order in Dynamic Systems”(14) “Turbulence, chaotic dynamics, the fractal nature of strange attractors and the sensitive dependence on initial conditions for systems confined to them, Lyapunov exponents, the transition to chaos through Period doubling and the Fourier analysis of power structures make traditional dynamic prediction for individual systems impossible.” These chaotic dynamics, otherwise known as “the butterfly effect” (a butterfly flapping its wings could result in a hurricane 1,000s of miles away) mean that an unfortunate combination of indeterministic radioactive decays has probably caused a cancer that aborted the career of someone who could have gone on to dramatically change civilization. Nobelist Ilya Prigogine, in “The End of Certainty – Time, Chaos and the New Laws of Physics”(15) suggests the latter effects are more important, as they are driven by time-irreversible processes, dependent on entropy. (Technically, this is due to Poincare resonances between degrees of freedom prohibiting the integration of dynamic systems characterized in terms of the kinetic and potential energies of their particles. Harmonic oscillations then give rise to nondeterministic Kalmogorov, Arnold & Moser (KAM) random trajectories as well as deterministic ones. Past a threshold, chaos drives the system to break time-symmetry, and entropy emerges.) Professor David Deutsch, in “The Beginning of Infinity – Explanations that Transform the World”(16), describes how quantum randomness depends on quantum pathways not taken in our own history within the multiverse, but which are considered as having taken other histories in a manner which is deterministic if summed over all histories, but completely random as far as which outcome occurs in our history, i.e., life. Therefore our life-story is not predetermined, but buffeted by random events. Quantum physicist Henry Stapp, in “Quantum Theory and Free Will: How Mental Intentions Translate into Bodily Actions”(17) writes “[t]he quantum resuscitation of the causal power of our thoughts overturns the absurd classical notion that nature has endowed us with conscious minds whose only power and function is to delude us into believing that it is helping us to create a future that advances our felt values, while in actuality that future was predetermined 15 billion years ago”. David Layzer, writing in Scientific American(18), explained that as the early Universe expanded, at a rate faster than which matter and radiation could move into the new space, there were departures from thermal equilibrium which represented macroscopic information and the creation of novelty, contradicting determinism. Ruth Kastner, a strong advocate of free will, considered her Relativistic Transactional Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics to be most appropriate in defiance of Einstein’s deterministic Blocktime Universe(19). From this, we should be able to rule out the possibility that any hypothetical Intelligence could, on the basis of knowing the position and momentum of every particle emerging from the violence of the inchoate Universe, calculate the resulting position of every atom now, and on into the future. Therefore, the interaction of any two separate systems, such as a stranger mistakenly phoning you as a “wrong number” at the exact moment that your kettle starts to boil, must be regarded as a coincidence and nothing more. But denial of what I call “hard determinism” still allows the possibility of a softer, or “ad hoc” version, that of the “I was raised by abusive parents in a crime-ridden neighborhood, therefore my tragic circumstances made me do it” defense. Clearly, there is merit to soft determinism. If you take the 100 richest families in America, many of their scions will go to Ivy-League colleges, and it is highly improbable that any of them will end up selling crack on a street corner. (The theme of the 1983 movie “Trading Places”). In a poor neighborhood in Baltimore, the reverse is true. Nonetheless, it is possible for children in these environments to resist joining gangs, to study hard and win scholarships to prestigious universities. What is needed is determination, not determinism.
Denial of “hard” determinism means that a person’s action is not in any absolute sense shaped or caused by the past. Our genetics, also, are administered a dose of randomness during the biological process of meiosis during cell division. This means that no matter what our genetics, environment or experience, at each choosing point we are free to and just might make the unexpected choice that would confound the prediction of a discreetly observing social scientist. Therefore, you and I would be an existentialist as described by Kierkegaard or even Sartre. But the Determinists have pointed out that it also means that no matter what our initial character, training, resolve, or, in fact, our Will might be, we may end up choosing to act in spite of ourselves.
A man might wake up one morning and be faced with the choice of whether or not to strangle a priest. Despite years of respect, resolve, Will, and also the consequences to be expected all cautioning to the contrary, he might spontaneously commit the crime. If he acted against his Will it would not be fair to hold him responsible for his actions. If we cannot go to bed at night without fearing for our actions of the morrow, then, paradoxically, we have lost the freedom to act according to our Will. If God can provoke us to act against our Will merely by challenging us with unwelcome choices out of the blue, then it is He who must hold the responsibility, and we have no Free Will.
On the other hand, again paradoxically, if it must be said that as free moral agents we will necessarily act according to what our Will was prior to the choice being put, then the choice is “predetermined”. Our Will is then the result of a stepwise series of causes beginning with the history of our parents, their genetics, and our upbringing. We have no more freedom of choice than does a pocket calculator, and cannot, for that reason, be held responsible for our actions. So the problem we are facing is that neither the advocate of indeterminist freedom nor the determinist can describe the way our actions are governed. We are not pocket calculators, but neither is our Will so spontaneous as to be beyond our control. Since we are capable of changing our minds, of acting unexpectedly, we are not 100 percent predetermined, yet since our Will is a fairly stable construct not readily given to reversals out of the blue, we are not 100 percent Free, either. God, if omnipotent, created us with a Will neither free nor determined nor clearly our own responsibility. If omniscient, God foresaw the result and found it satisfactory. Only God could have Willed differently. Even a hypothetical God of Limited Liability, who had devolved to the throw of dice much of his authority, would be (if not exactly fully responsible) fully to blame for our lack of Free Will.
Some theologians have responded to this logical conundrum by at least partially denying to God His omniscience. In Richard Rice’s controversial “The Openness of God: The Relationship of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will”(20), he proposed “Open”, or “Free Will Theism”, in which God is omniscient about “settled” reality, but leaves the future open to decisions based on unforeseeable human attitudes and responses. This leaves more questions unanswered than answered. If the human attitudes and responses aren’t foreseeable, then why aren’t they random? If they aren’t random because He is able to guide them, then why are they so often evil? If He is unable to guide them to better outcomes, then where is His power? And if He chooses not to use His power, then where is His benevolence?
We have examined the religious explanation of Good, Evil, and Free Will, and found it unsatisfactory. God cannot grant us Free Will, and therefore there is no excuse for the amount of evil in the world. God cannot be omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent at the same time. If He could grant us Free Will, then He could not be perfect. If He is perfect, then He is responsible for all the world’s evil. A humanist position is very much simpler. If there is no God, we have no reason to expect a perfect world, and indeed, we do not have one. When events can be expected to occur on a fortuitous basis, then any particular is likely to be considered fortunate by some people and unfortunate by others, and the existence of primary good and evil is established. But when it comes to secondary good or evil, we have to decide, as philosophers, whether our choice is determined by Fate or Free Will, or both. God cannot grant us Free Will, but we can earn it. How we can do this is the subject of my paper entitled “Of Clouds, Clocks and Free Will”.
References
- Pope John Paul II. Address to the Catholic World Youth Festival in Toronto on July 25, 2002. TV broadcast, Euronews, personally witnessed.
- Peter Steinfels. “Beliefs” New York Times, April 1, 2006
- Robert D. McFadden. “James G. Watt, 85, Dies; Secretary Who Favored Developing Wilderness”. New York Times, June 10, 2023
- From “God’s Justice and Ours”, in Catholic publication First Things, May 2002
- Glenn Scherer. “The Godly Must be Crazy”. Chronogram, January, 2005
- Bob Herbert. “Bush’s Blinkers”. New York Times, October 22, 2004
- Ibn Warraq. “Virgins? What Virgins?” Free Inquiry, December 2005
- MacGregor, Kirk R. Luis de Molina: “The Life and Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge, Zondervan. Grand Rapids MI, Kindle edition, 2015, p11
- Jonathan Oppenheim and Stephanie Wohner. “The Uncertainty Principle determines the nonlocality of quantum mechanics”. Science 19 Nov. 2010, Vol 330, #6007, pp 1072-4
- Peter Ulric Tse. “The Neural Basis of Free Will”, MIT Press, 2013, adapted from Appendix 1
- Dr. Ruth E. Kastner. “Why arguments against Free Will based on Physics are hugely overrated” (in Probing the Meaning of Quantum Mechanics: Superpositions, Dynamics, Semantics and Identity; eds D. Aerts et al, doi.org/10.1142/10185, 2016)
- Richard Muller. “Now. The Physics of Time”, W.W. Norton & Co. NY 2016, chap 22
- Paul Davies. “The Demon in the Machine”, Chicago University Press, 2019, p 393
- Stephen H. Kellert. “In the Wake of Chaos: Unpredictable Order in Dynamic Systems, Chicago University Press,1993
- Ilya Prigogine. “The End of Certainty – Time, Chaos and the New Laws of Physics”. Free Press, 1997)
- David Deutsch. “The Beginning of Infinity – Explanations that Transform the World”, Viking, 2011, Chapter 8
- Henry Stapp. “Quantum Theory and Free Will: How Mental Intentions Translate into Bodily Actions”, Cham, SZ: Springer, 2017
- David Layzer. “The Arrow of Time”, Scientific American, December 1975, pp 54-69
- Ruth Kastner. “The Transactional Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics”, Cambridge University Press, 2013
- Richard Rice. “The Openness of God: The Relationship of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will”, Review and Herald Publishing, 1980